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A COMPARATIVE FAULT APPROACH TO THE
DUE DILIGENCE REQUIREMENT OF RULE 10b-5
INTRODUCTION
Promulgated pursuant to the comprehensive antifraud mandate
established by section 10(b) 1 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934,2
rule 10b-5 3 prohibits the commission of any fraudulent act and the
issuance of any false or materially misleading statement in connection
with the purchase or sale of any security. Since the implication of a
private action under this section,' courts have exercised considerable
1. Section 10b of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b)
(1976), provides that "[i]t shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by
the use of any means or instrumentality of interstate commerce or of the mails, or of
any facility of any national securities exchange . . . (b) To use or employ, in connec-
tion with the purchase or sale of any security registered on a national securities
exchange or any security not so registered, any manipulative or deceptive device or
contrivance in contravention of such rules and regulations as the Commission may
prescribe as necessary or appropriate in the public interest or for the protection of
investors."
2. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-78kk (1976) (1934 Act). The federal securities laws were
enacted during a period of economic and political upheaval marked by rampant spec-
ulation in the securities markets. The 1934 Act was directed primarily at the national
trading markets, as distinguished from the new issue markets, and was intended to
shield investors from unscrupulous price manipulation. Ernst & Ernst v. Hoclfelder,
425 U.S. 185, 195 (1976); 1 A. Bromberg & L. Lowenfels, Securities Fraud & Com-
modities Fraud § 2.2, at 2.16 (1979).
3. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1980). The rule provides that "[i]t shall be unlawful
for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of an), means or instrumentality of
interstate commerce, or of the mails or of any facility of any national securities ex-
change, (a) To employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud, (b) To make any
untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state a material fact necessary in
order to make the statements made, in the light of the circumstances under which
they were made, not misleading, or (c) To engage in an' act, practice, or course of
business which operates or would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person, in
connection with the purchase or sale of any security." Id.
4. A private right of action under lob-5 was first recognized in Kardon v.
National Gypsum Co., 69 F. Supp. 512, 513-14 (E.D. Pa. 1946); see Fischman v.
Raytheon Mfg. Co., 188 F.2d 783, 786-87 (2d Cir. 1951) (recognition of buyer's im-
plied cause of action when "fraud" is shown). The Supreme Court expressly recog-
nized the private right of action in Superintendent of Ins. v. Banker's Life & Cas.
Co., 404 U.S. 6, 13 n.9 (1971). A properly stated cause of action under rule 10b-5
must allege the scienter of the defendant, Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S.
185, 193 n.12 (1976), the materiality of any omission or misrepresentation by tile
defendant, Arber v. Essex Wire Corp., 490 F.2d 414, 418 (6th Cir.), cert. denied,
419 U.S. 830 (1974); Rogen v. Ilikon Corp., 361 F.2d 260, 266 (1st Cir. 1966). and
the extent of actual reliance by the plaintiff on the defendant's statements. Hold-
sworth v. Strong, 545 F.2d 687, 695-97 (10th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 955
(1977); Titan Group, Inc. v. Faggen, 513 F.2d 234, 238-39 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
423 U.S. 840 (1975); Rochez Bros. v. Rhoades, 491 F.2d 402, 410 (3d Cir. 1973).
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latitude 5 in formulating elements of the cause of action as well as its
defenses. 6 One such defense, the failure of the plaintiff to exercise
Proof of actual reliance is not required when defendants have omitted, rather than
misrepresented, information. Affiliated Ute Citizens v. United States, 406 U.S. 128,
153-54 (1972). Reliance on the omission will be presumed when the omission is
material. E.g., Competitive Assoc. v. Laventhol, Krekstein, Horwath & Horwath,
516 F.2d 811, 814 (2d Cir. 1975). When reliance must be proven, it must also be
justifiable. Holdsworth v. Strong, 545 F.2d 687, 695-97 (10th Cir. 1976), cert. de-
nied, 430 U.S. 955 (1977); Clement A. Evans & Co. v. McAlpine, 434 F.2d 100,
103-04 (5th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 402 U.S. 988 (1971); see Straub v. Vaisman &
Co., 540 F.2d 591, 595-98 (3d Cir. 1976); Rochez Bros. v. Rhoades, 491 F.2d 402,
410-11 (3d Cir. 1973). Although the justifiability of plaintiff's reliance is often trans-
lated into a due diligence requirement, the two can be distinguished for analytical
purposes. "Reliance considers whether the plaintiff was in fact influenced in his in-
vestment decision by the untrue statements or omission of the defendant." Wheeler,
Plaintiff's Duty of Due Care Under Rule 10b-5: An Implied Defense to an Implied
Remedy, 70 Nw. U.L. Rev. 561, 592 (1975) (footnote omitted); see Rogen v. Ilikon
Corp., 361 F.2d 260, 267-68 (1st Cir. 1966); List v. Fashion Park, Inc., 340 F.2d
457, 462-63 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 811 (1965). On the other hand, due
diligence considers whether the plaintiff was influenced in his investment decision by
defendant's untrue statements or omissions because plaintiff failed to conduct a
reasonable investigation to discover additional information. See Wheeler, supra, at
598.
5. It has been stated that rule 10b-5 was a deliberate effort by the Securities
and Exchange Commission (SEC) to make the prohibitions contained in § 17(a) of the
Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. § 77m (1976), applicable to purchasers as well as to
sellers of securities. 1 A. Bromberg & L. Lowenfels, upra note 2, § 2.2, at 2.28.
Because the rule was not intended to be enforced by private parties, id. § 2.3, at
2.52, the elements and defenses of the private 10b-5 action are largely judicial crea-
tions without direct statutory basis. Id.
6. A number of defenses to rule 10b-5 actions have gradually been established
on an ad hoc basis. Among these are laches, waiver, estoppel, see Mihara v. Dean
Witter & Co., 619 F.2d 814, 822 (9th Cir. 1980); Nemkov v. O'Hare Chicago Corp.,
592 F.2d 351, 354 (7th Cir. 1979); Bosse v. Crowell Collier & MacMillan, 565 F.2d
602, 611 n.15 (9th Cir. 1977); Fey v. Walston & Co., 493 F.2d 1036, 1049 (7th Cir.
1974); Landry v. Hemphill, Noyes & Co., 473 F.2d 365, 374 (Ist Cir.), cert. denied,
414 U.S. 1002 (1973); Hecht v. Harris, Upham & Co., 430 F.2d 1202, 1207 (9th Cir.
1970); Royal Air Properties, Inc. v. Smith, 312 F.2d 210, 213-14 (9th Cir. 1962);
Collins v. Ruskin, 342 F. Supp. 1282, 1291 (D. Mass. 1972); Marth v. Industrial
Incomes, Inc., 290 F. Supp. 755, 758-59 (S.D.N.Y. 1968), in pari delicto, Wolfson v.
Baker, 623 F.2d 1074, 1081-83 (5th Cir. 1980); Gordon v. duPont Glore Forgan,
Inc., 487 F.2d 1260, 1262-63 (5th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 946 (1974);
Hogan v. Teledyne, Inc., 328 F. Supp. 1043, 1047 (N.D. Ill. 1971); Wohli v. Blair &
Co., 50 F.R.D. 89, 91-93 (S.D.N.Y. 1970); Kuehnert v. Texstar Corp., 286 F. Supp.
340, 345 (S.D. Tex. 1968), aff'd, 412 F.2d 700 (5th Cir. 1969), and the statute of
limitations. Roberts v. Magnetic Metals Co., 611 F.2d 450, 452 (3d Cir. 1979); Jones
v. Ford Motor Co., 599 F.2d 394, 398-99 (10th Cir. 1979); Williams v. Sinclair, 529
F.2d 1383, 1387-88 (9th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 426 U.S. 936 (1976); Berry Pe-
troleum Co. v. Adams & Peck, 518 F.2d 402, 406-09 (2d Cir. 1975); Schaefer v. First
Nat'l Bank, 509 F.2d 1287, 1293-95 (7th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 943
(1976); Parrent v. Midwest Rug Mills, Inc., .455 F.2d 123, 127 (7th Cir. 1972); Mitch-
ell v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 446 F.2d 90, 103-04 (10th Cir. 1971), cert. denied,
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due care- or due diligence' precludes recovery when a plaintiff has
failed to inquire or confirm the truthfulness of defendant's misrepre-
sentations or omissions in a manner calculated to avert the commis-
sion of a fraud. 9
Due diligence reflects the notion that rule 10b-5 does not remedy
private losses that are partially or wholly attributable to plaintiffs'
405 U.S. 918 (1972); Janigan v. Taylor, 344 F.2d 781, 783-84 (1st Cir.l, cert. denied,
382 U.S. 879 (1965).
7. See, e.g., Holdsworth v. Strong, 545 F.2d 687, 692 (10th Cir. 1976), cert.
denied, 430 U.S. 955 (1977); Rochez Bros. v. Rhoades, 491 F.2d 402, 409 t3d Cir.
1973); McLean v. Alexander, 420 F. Supp. 1057, 1077-78 (D. Del. 1976).
8. See, e.g., Mallis v. Bankers Trust Co., 615 F.2d 68, 78 (2d Cir. 1990); Bird
v. Ferry, 497 F.2d 112, 118-19 (5th Cir. 1974); Mitchell v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co.,
446 F.2d 90, 102 (10th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 918 (1972); Clement A.
Evans & Co. v. McAlpine, 434 F.2d 100, 103 (5th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 402 U.S.
988 (1971). This Note will refer to the due care or due diligence requirements as due
diligence.
9. E.g., Clegg v. Conk, 507 F.2d 1351, 1360 (10th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 422
U.S. 1007 (1975); Vohs v. Dickson, 495 F.2d 607, 623 (5th Cir. 1974); Rochez Bros.
v. Rhoades, 491 F.2d 402, 409 (3d Cir. 1973); Financial Indus. Fund, Inc. v.
McDonnell Douglas Corp., 474 F.2d 514, 517, 521 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 414
U.S. 874 (1973); Mitchell v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 446 F.2d 90, 103 (10th Cir.
1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 918 (1972); Clement A. Evans & Co. v. McAlpine, 434
F.2d 100, 103-04 (5th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 402 U.S. 988 (1971); City Nat'l Bank
v. Vanderboom, 422 F.2d 221, 230 n.10, 231 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 399 U.S. 905
(1970); Myzel v. Fields, 386 F.2d 718, 736 (8th Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S.
951 (1968); Harnett v. Ryan Homes, Inc., 360 F. Supp. 878, 886-87 (W.D. Pa.
1973), aff'd, 496 F.2d 832 (1974); Lane v. Midwest Bancshares Corp., 337 F. Supp.
1200, 1209 (E.D. Ark. 1972); Kaplan v. Vornado, Inc., 341 F. Supp. 212, 216 (N.D.
Ill. 1971); Chris-Craft Indus. v. Piper Aircraft Corp., 337 F. Supp. 1128, 1135
(S.D.N.Y. 1971), aff'd in part, rev'd in part and remanded, 480 F.2d 341 (2d Cir.),
cert. denied, 414 U.S. 910 (1973); Rogen v. Ilikon Corp., 250 F. Supp. 112, 117 (D.
Mass), rev'd, 361 F.2d 260 (1st Cir. 1966); 5 A. Jacobs, The Impact of Rule 1Ob-5, §
64.01 [b] [ii], at 3-248 (rev. ed. 1980). The due diligence defense under rule 1ob-5
should not be confused with the due diligence defense available to defendants under
§ 11 of the Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. § 77k (1976). Under that section,
liability may be avoided for the issuance of a false or misleading registration state-
ment when it is established that the defendant "had, after reasonable inrestigation,
reasonable ground to believe and did believe, at the time such part of the registra-
tion statement became effective, that the statements therein were true and that there
was no omission to state a material fact required to be stated therein or necessary to
make the statements therein not misleading." 15 U.S.C. § 77k(b)(3) (1976) (emphasis
added). The due diligence defense created under § 11 is available to all signers of a
registration statement except the issuer. 15 U.S.C. § 77k(b)(3)(A) (1976). As to any
portion issued on the authority of an expert, the expert may resort to the defense as
to that portion of the registration statement based on his authority as an expert. 15
U.S.C. § 77k(b)(3)(B) (1976). A non-expert may rely on these portions if he has no
reasonable ground to believe and does not believe that any of the statements are
untrue. 15 U.S.C. § 77k(b)(3)(C) (1976). See generally Feit v. Leasco Data Processing
Equip. Corp., 332 F. Supp. 544, 575-83 (E.D.N.Y. 1971); Escott v. BarChris Constr.
Corp., 283 F. Supp. 643, 682-703 (S.D.N.Y. 1968).
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culpable conduct.10 Although the Supreme Court has not expressly
recognized the due diligence requirement," a majority of federal
courts 1 and commentators 13 have equated the Court's silence with
approval and have recognized the validity of the requirement. This
10. Wheeler, supra note 4, at 563. See also, Comment, Due Diligence Defense in
Rule 10b-5: The Hochfelder Aftershocks, 11 Ind. L. Rev. 727, 727 (1978) [hereinafter
cited as Aftershocks].
11. To date, the Supreme Court has refused to entertain the issue. In dissenting
from the denial of certiorari in Dupuy v. Dupuy, Justice White stated that "[t]he
Court should take this opportunity to clarify the standard of care expected of plain-
tiffs in litigation under Rule 10b-5. Business can be transacted more freely and effi-
ciently if the responsibility for verifying underlying facts is clearly allocated. Because
securities litigation can be complex and expensive, it [should] be avoided to the
maximum extent by early clarification of the ground rules. This Court should thus
promptly resolve the existing uncertainty as to the proper standard of care required
of plaintiffs after Ernst & Ernst." Dupuy v. Dupuy, 434 U.S. 911, 912 (White, J.,
dissenting), denying cert. to 551 F.2d 1005 (5th Cir. 1977).
12. See note 9 supra and accompanying text. Nearly all circuits presently recog-.
nize the necessity of a due diligence requirement. E.g., Mallis v. Bankers Trust Co.,
615 F.2d 68, 78-79 (2d Cir. 1980); Holmes v. Bateson, 583 F.2d 542, 559 & n.21 (1st
Cir. 1978); Sundstrand Corp. v. Sun Chem. Co., 553 F.2d 1033, 1048-49 (7th Cir.),
cert. denied, 434 U.S. 875 (1977); Dupuy v. Dupuy, 551 F.2d 1005, 1013-20 (5th
Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 911 (1977); Holdsworth v. Strong, 545 F.2d 687, 693-95
(10th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 955 (1977); Straub v. Vaisman & Co., 540
F.2d 591, 596-98 (3d Cir. 1976); White v. Abrams, 495 F.2d 724, 732-33 (9th Cir.
1974); Arber v. Essex Wire Corp., 490 F.2d 414, 420-21 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 419
U.S. 830 (1974); City Nat'l Bank v. Vanderboom, 422 F.2d 221, 230-31 (8th Cir.),
cert. denied, 399 U.S. 905 (1970). Although the Fourth Circuit has yet to express its
position with regard to due diligence, a Virginia District Court has recognized that a
threshold due diligence requirement exists in the Fourth Circuit. See American Gen.
Ins. Co. v. Equitable Gen. Corp., 493 F. Supp. 721, 7,6-47 (E.D. Va. 1980). Addi-
tionally, the D.C. Circuit has not yet formulated a due diligence standard. The pro-
posed Federal Securities Code has expressly adopted a defense based on a plaintiff's
failure to exercise due diligence. See ALI Fed. Sec. Code § 1703(e) (1978) ("Defense
of Plaintiff's Knowledge").
13. The most thoughtful and provocative endorsement of the requirement is pre-
sented in Wheeler, supra note 4. The field is rife with commentaries. E.g., Camp-
bell, Elements of Recovery Under Rule 10b-5: Scienter, Reliance and Plaintiff's
Reasonable Conduct Requirement, 26 S.C.L. Rev. 653 (1975); Comment, Abrogation
of Plaintiff's Due Care Requirement in Private Actions Under Rule 10b-5, 28 Case
W. L. Rev. 399 (1978) [hereinafter cited as Abrogation of Due Care]; Aftershocks
supra note 10, at 727; Comment, Due Care: Still a Limitation on 10b-5 Recovery?,
61 Marq. L. Rev. 122 (1977) [hereinafter cited as Still a Limitation]; Comment,
Plaintiff's Duty of Care After Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 73 Nw. U.L. Rev. 158
(1978); Comment, Plaintiff's Standard of Care After Hochfelder: Toward a Theory
of Causation, 31 Vand. L. Rev. 1225 (1978) [hereinafter cited as Causation]; Com-
ment, A Reevaluation of the Due Diligence Requirement for Plaintiffs in Private
Actions Under SEC Rule 10b-5, 1978 Wis. L. Rev. 904; Note, The Due Diligence
Requirement for Plaintiffs Under Rule 10b-5, 1975 Duke L.J. 753 [hereinafter cited
as Due Diligence]; Note, Negligent Misrepresentations Under Rule lob-5, 32 U. Clii.
L. Rev. 824 (1965); 12 Ga. L. Rev. 112 (1977); 50 Temp. L.Q. 124 (1976).
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Note examines the use of the due diligence requirement as a means
of reducing, rather than barring, 10b-5 recoveries. Part I will present
the relevant historical background of the due diligence requirement.
Part II will suggest that due diligence can be reformulated as a liabil-
ity-reducing rule rather than a liability-denying rule without blunting
the rule's deterrent effect and will offer a liability-reducing formula-
tion drawn from the evolving notion of comparative fault in tort.
I. DUE DILIGENCE HISTORICALLY CONSIDERED
Prior to the Supreme Court's decision in Ernst & Ernst v.
Hochfelder, 14 federal courts were free to premise civil liability for
violations of rule 10b-5 on negligent misconduct.'" In this context,
14. 425 U.S. 185 (1976).
15. See, e.g., Hughes v. Dempsey-Tegeler & Co., 534 F.2d 156, 176 (9th Cir.),
cert. denied, 429 U.S. 896 (1976); Woodward v. Metro Bank, 522 F.2d 84, 93 (5th
Cir. 1975); Robinson v. Cupples Container Co., 513 F.2d 1274, 1278 (9th Cir. 1975);
Hochfelder v. Ernst & Ernst, 503 F.2d 1100, 1107-09 (7th Cir. 1974), revd., 45
U.S. 185 (1976); Hudak v. Economic Research Analysts, Inc., 499 F.2d 996, 1000
(5th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1122 (1975); White v. Abrams, 495 F.2d 724,
730-31 (9th Cir. 1974); Vohs v. Dickson, 495 F.2d 607, 622 (5th Cir. 1974); Sargent
v. Genesco, Inc., 492 F.2d 750, 761 (5th Cir. 1974); Financial Indus. Fund, Inc. v.
McDonnell Douglas Corp., 474 F.2d 514, 517 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 874
(1973); Parrent v. Midwest Rug Mills, Inc., 455 F.2d 123, 126 (7th Cir. 1972); Cle-
ment A. Evans & Co. v. McAlpine, 434 F.2d 100, 103-04 (5th Cir. 1970), cert.
denied, 402 U.S. 988 (1971); Vanderboom v. Sexton, 422 F.2d 1233, 1239 (8th Cir.),
cert. denied, 400 U.S. 852 (1970); City Nat'l Bank v. Vanderboom, 422 F.2d 221,
229-30 & n.9 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 399 U.S. 905 (1970); Texasgulf, Inc. v. Canada
Dev. Corp., 366 F. Supp. 374, 420-21 (S.D. Tex. 1973); Blakely v. Lisac, 357 F.
Supp. 255, 262, 264-67 (D. Or. 1972); Lane v. Midwest Baneshares Corp., 337 F.
Supp. 1200, 1210 (E.D. Ark. 1972); Drake v. Thor Power Tool Co., 282 F. Supp. 94,
105 (N.D. III. 1967). A substantial number of courts, however, had required that the
conduct of defendants exceed mere negligence. Compare Clegg v. Conk, 507 F.2d
1351, 1361-62 (10th Cir. 1974) (scienter required to maintain a private damage action
under rule 10b-5), cert. denied, 422 U.S. 1007 (1975) and Smallwood v. Pearl Brew-
ing Co., 489 F.2d 579, 606 (5th Cir.) (same), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 873 (1974) and
Lanza v. Drexel & Co., 479 F.2d 1277, 1306 (2d Cir. 1973) (same) and Shemtob v.
Shearson, Hammill & Co., 448 F.2d 442, 445 (2d Cir. 1971) (same) and Hornblower
& Weeks-Hemphill, Noyes v. Burchfield, 366 F. Supp. 1364, 1366 (S.D.N.Y. 1973)
(same) and Gerstle v. Gamble-Skogmo, Inc., 298 F. Supp. 66, 97 (E.D.N.Y. 1969)
(same), aff'd and modified, 478 F.2d 1281 (2d Cir. 1973) with Carras v. Burns, 516
F.2d 251, 256 (4th Cir. 1975) (conduct equivalent to scienter probably required) and
SEC v. Coffey, 493 F.2d 1304, 1314, 1316 n.30 (6th Cir. 1974) (same), cert. denied,
420 U.S. 908 (1975) and Rochez Bros. v. Rhoades, 491 F.2d 402, 407-08 (3d Cir.
1973) (same), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 993 (1976) and Leasco Corp. v. Taussig, 473
F.2d 777, 785 (2d Cir. 1972) (same) and Gordon v. Burr, 366 F. Supp. 156, 167




the absence of plaintiff's due diligence attained prominence as an
absolute defense 1 analogous to contributory negligence at common
law.17  The generally accepted rationale for this rule was that, if a
defendant were potentially liable for statements or omissions made
without specific fraudulent intent, equity dictated that a comparable
standard govern plaintiff's dealings."8
Although federal courts consistently used the lack of due diligence
to bar certain plaintiffs, the procedural treatment of the requirement
was not uniform. Courts recognized it as either an element of
plaintiff's case,' 9 a component of plaintiff's justifiable reliance,2" an
affirmative defense to be pleaded by defendant,"1 or one factor to be
considered in determining what information a defendant was required
to disclose to a particular buyer or seller.22 Regardless of the differ-
16. In practice, the due diligence requirement operates as a defense, although it
has been raised under a number of divergent rationales. See note 19-22 infra and
accompanying text.
17. Contributory negligence has been defined as an "act or omission amounting
to the want of ordinary care on the part of the complaining party, which, concurring
with the negligence of the defendant, is the proximate cause of the injury." Honaker
v. Crutchfield, 247 Ky. 495, 501, 57 S.W.2d 502, 504 (1933). If a plaintiff is held to
be contributorily negligent he will be barred from recovery. See H. Woods, Compar-
ative Fault § 1:3, at 7 (1978).
18. See Dupuy v. Dupuy, 551 F.2d 1005, 1014 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S.
911 (1977); Holdsworth v. Strong, 545 F.2d 687, 692-93 (10th Cir. 1976), cert. do-
nied, 430 U.S. 955 (1977); Straub v. Vaisman & Co., 540 F.2d 591, 597 (3d Cir.
1976); McLean v. Alexander, 420 F. Supp. 1057, 1078 (D. Del. 1976). Professor
Bromberg has noted "that the circuits which have most clearly charged defendant
with constructive knowledge or diligence are, by and large, the same courts that
have similarly charged plaintiff. There is a logic and a balance in this. A high stand-
ard of conduct for defendant justifies a high standard for plaintiff. Stated a little
differently, the price plaintiff pays for being relieved of ... proving defendant's in-
tent or actual knowledge, is that plaintiff himself must show some diligence." 3 A.
Bromberg & L. Lowenfels, supra note 2, § 8.4, at 204.248.
19. E.g., Dupuy v. Dupuy, 551 F.2d 1005, 1014, 1016 (5th Cir.), cert, denied,
434 U.S. 911 (1977); Clement A. Evans & Co. v. McAlpine, 434 F.2d 100, 104 (5th
Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 402 U.S. 988 (1971).
20. E.g., Sundstrand Corp. v. Sun Chem. Corp., 553 F.2d 1033, 1048-49 (7th
Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 875 (1977); Holdsworth v. Strong, 545 F.2d 687, 695
(10th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 955 (1977); White v. Abrams, 495 F.2d 724,
736 (9th Cir. 1974); Vohs v. Dickson, 495 F.2d 607, 622-23 (5th Cir. 1974); Rochez
Bros. v. Rhoades, 491 F.2d 402, 410 (3d Cir. 1973); Myzel v. Fields, 386 F.2d 718,
735-36 (8th Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 951 (1968); Kohler v. Kohler Co., 319
F.2d 634, 642 (7th Cir. 1963).
21. See Clement A. Evans & Co. v. McAlpine, 434 F.2d 100, 103 (5th Cir.
1970), cert. denied, 402 U.S. 988 (1971).
22. E.g., White v. Abrams, 495 F.2d 724, 736 (9th Cir. 1974) (the variable duty
of disclosure depends on the sophistication and status of the buyer or seller); Arber
v. Essex Wire Corp., 490 F.2d 414, 418 (6th Cir.) (same), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 830
(1974); Kohler v. Kohler Co., 319 F.2d 634, 642 (7th Cir. 1963) (same).
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ent procedural classifications, however, the test of plaintiff's conduct
was inevitably subjective,' varying in response to the status and busi-
ness acumen of the individual plaintiff.2 ' Thus, the early due dili-
gence standard did not correspond exactly to the common law
concept of contributory negligence, which considered a plaintiff's
conduct according to an objective test of due care.2a Moreover, due
diligence was more limited than a duty of reasonable care because
plaintiffs were never required to investigate beyond the corporation,
its officers, and its business records.'
Hochfelder did not directly address the issue of due diligence.r
The Supreme Court held only that no private action for damages
under section 10b and rule 10b-5 2 may lie "in the absence of any
23. E.g., Dupuy v. Dupuy, 551 F.2d 1005, 1023 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 434
U.S. 911 (1977); McLean v. Alexander, 420 F. Supp. 1057, 1077-79 (D. Del. 1976).
Franklin Sav. Bank v. Levy, 406 F. Supp. 40, 46 (S.D.N.Y. 1975), rev'd and re-
manded, 551 F.2d 521 (2d Cir. 1977); see Still a Limitation, supra note 13, at 125; Note,
Reliance Under Rule lob-5: Is the "Reasonable Investor" Reasonable?, 72 Colum. L. Rev.
562, 565-66 (1972).
24. E.g., Dupuy v. Dupuy, 551 F.2d 1005, 1016 5th Cir.), cert. denied, 434
U.S. 911 (1977); Holdsworth v. Strong, 545 F.2d 687, 696-97 (10th Cir. 1976), cert.
denied, 430 U.S. 955 (1977); Bird v. Ferry, 497 F.2d 112, 114 (5th Cir. 1974); Myzel
v. Fields, 386 F.2d 718, 736 (8th Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 951 (1968). As
the court stated in Dupuy, "[t]he role model for a plaintiff, then, is an investor with
the attributes of the plaintiff, rather than the average investor." 551 F.2d at 1016. In
determining the plaintiff's duty of due diligence, a court wvill examine circumstances
such as the existence of a fiduciary relationship, concealment of the fraud, opportu-
nity for detection of the fraud, and plaintiff's sophistication and position in the in-
vestment community. Id.
25. Restatement (Second) of Torts § 464 (1965).
26. See Dupuy v. Dupuy, 551 F.2d 1005, 1023 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S.
911 (1977); Rogen v. Ilikon Corp., 361 F.2d 260, 266-67 (1st Cir. 1966); Kohler v.
Kohler Co., 319 F.2d 634, 641-42 (7th Cir. 1963); Jackson v. Oppenheim, 411 F.
Supp. 659, 668 (S.D.N.Y. 1974).
27. Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 193 (1976). The Court rejected a
finding of liability for an accounting firm's certification of a negligent audit that failed
to disclose a fraudulent securities scheme. Id.
28. The Supreme Court did not address the degree of defendant's culpable con-
duct that must be alleged in an injunctive action by the SEC. That issue was raised
and resolved in Aaron v. SEC, 100 S. Ct. 1945, 1952-53 (1980), which required
scienter. Aaron is the latest in a series of Supreme Court decisions that have tended
to restrict the 10b-5 cause of action. E.g., Chiarella v. United States, 100 S. Ct.
1108, 1116-18 (1980) (nondisclosure by a non-fiduciary not actionable under rule lOb-
a); International Bhd. of Teamsters v. Daniel, 439 U.S. 551, 563-69 (1979) (employee
interests in non-compulsory union pension plan are not "securities" for 10b-5 pur-
poses); Santa Fe Industries, Inc. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462, 474-77 (1977) ("short-form
Delaware merger" with full disclosure subsequent to the merger is not actionable
under rule 10b-5); Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 197-206 (1976) (estab-
lishment of "scienter" as a necessary element of the 10b-5 private cause of action),
Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 731-32 (1975) (affirming
requirement that plaintiffs in 10b-5 actions be either "buyers" or "sellers" of secur-
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allegation of 'scienter'- intent to deceive, manipulate, or defraud."9
The Court expressly considered and rejected liability for "negligent
ities). This limiting trend in lob-5 litigation parallels a limiting trend in related areas
of securities litigation. See Touche Ross & Co. v. Redington, 442 U.S. 560, 568-71
(1979) (denial of implied cause of action under § 17(a) of the Securities Exchange Act
of 1934); TSC Indus., Inc. v. Northway, Inc., 426 U.S. 438, 44549 (1976) (establish-
ment of strict standard respecting "materiality" in proxy issuances); Cort v. Ash, 422
U.S. 66, 77-85 (1975) (refusal to recognize implied cause of action with respect to
shareholders' grievances against corporate directors involved in illegal political cam-
paign contributions).
29. 425 U.S. at 193 (footnote and citation omitted). By ruling that clearly fraudu-
lent conduct is proscribed by the Act, the Court disallowed negligence as a basis for
liability. It failed, however, to indicate whether any points on the "wide spectrum of
prohibited behavior between negligence and specific intent to defraud," McLean v.
Alexander, 420 F. Supp. 1057, 1078 (D. Del. 1976), could give rise to liability. See
Bucklo, The Supreme Court Attempts to Define Scienter Under Rule lOb-5: Ernst &
Ernst v. Hochfelder, 29 Stan. L. Rev. 213, 214-15 (1977). At first glance, the Court's
definition of scienter connotes the narrowest interpretation of common law fraud,
which requires a specific intent to deceive the person to whom the speaker conveys
information. Id. at 218; see Restatement of Torts § 531 (1934). Nevertheless, the
Court refused to decide whether recklessness is sufficient to impose 10b-5 liability.
This appears to indicate that Hochfelder did little more than reject negligence as a
basis for liability. Bucklo, supra, at 219. Hochfelder's recourse to the legislative his-
tory of the 1934 Act is of equally limited value in establishing a defendant's threshold
of prohibited conduct. Although the Court conceded that "the extensive legislative
history of the 1934 Act is bereft of any explicit explanation of Congress' intent," it
reasoned that the "relevant portions of that history support our conclusion that
§ 10(b) was addressed to practices that involve some element of scienter and cannot
be read to impose liability for negligent conduct alone." 425 U.S. at 201. In its
decision, the Court relied on language drawn from legislative hearings preceding the
Act's passage, indicating that § 10(b) was intended as a "'catch-all clause to prevent
manipulative devices."' 425 U.S. at 202. This language, the Court suggested, elimin-
ated negligence from consideration as a basis for liability. 425 U.S. at 199 n.21, 203.
The Court garnered additional support for its position from a Senate Report that
indicated that § 10(b) was directed at manipulative and deceptive practices that had
been demonstrated to "'fulfill no useful function."' 425 U.S. at 204-05. These prac-
tices in turn were illustrated in the Senate Report by fraudulent transactions that had
been traditionally associated with an intent to deceive. 4125 U.S. at 206. As a result of
the Court's failure to provide adequate guidelines with respect to defendant's cul-
pable conduct, divergent formulations of scienter have been proposed by federal
courts. E.g., Rolf v. Blyth Eastman Dillon & Co., Inc., 570 F.2d 38, 47 (2d Cir.)
(the necessity of alleging a specific intent to deceive or defraud would "disembowel
the private cause of action"), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1039 (1978); Abrahamson v.
Fleschner, 568 F.2d 862, 878 n.27 (2d Cir. 1977) (scienter does not require a show-
ing of intent to cause a loss to plaintiff), cert. denied, 436 U.S. 905 (1978); Sund-
strand Corp. v. Sun Chem. Corp., 553 F.2d 1033, 1045 (7th Cir.) (recklessness is
equivalent to the employment of a deceptive device), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 875
(1977); Utah State Univ. v. Bear, Stearns & Co., 549 F.2d 164, 169 (10th Cir.)
(willful or intentional misconduct, or the equivalent thereof, is sufficient to constitute
scienter), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 890 (1977); Arthur Lipper Corp. v. SEC, 547 F.2d
171, 181 (2d Cir. 1976) (specific intent to violate the law is not required to establish
scienter), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1009 (1978).
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conduct alone; ,,s3 faultless conduct and conduct resulting from an en-
tirely innocent mistake was also rejected as a basis for liability.'
Nevertheless, by premising 10b-5 liability on a finding of scienter,
Hochfelder cast doubt on the viability of a defense that barred a
claimant from a damage award by weighing his negligent behavior
against the intentional or reckless az conduct of a defendant.3 In re-
sponse to this problem, post-Hochfelder cases have rejected the
negligence formulation of due diligence " by analogizing the require-
ment to the tort law concept that contributory negligence may bar
30. 425 U.S. at 201.
31. Id. at 198, 207.
32. The Court noted that "[i]n certain areas of the law recklessness is considered
to be a form of intentional conduct." Id. at 193 n. 12. It declined, however, to define
recklessness or to state whether it conforms to the scienter requirement. Id. Prior to
Hochfelder, a majority of courts regarded recklessness as sufficient to constitute sci-
enter. E.g., Clegg v. Conk, 507 F.2d 1351, 1361-62 (10th Cir. 1974), cert. denied,
422 U.S. 1007 (1975); Rochez Bros. v. Rhoades, 491 F.2d 402, 407 (3d Cir. 1973);
Smallwood v. Pearl Brewing Co., 489 F.2d 579, 606 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 419
U.S. 873 (1974); Lanza v. Drexel & Co., 479 F.2d 1277, 1306 (2d Cir. 1973); Kohn
v. American Metal Climax, Inc., 458 F.2d 255, 279-88 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 409
U.S. 874 (1972); Shemtob v. Shearson, Hammill & Co., 448 F.2d 442, 445 (2d Cir.
1971). Subsequent to Hochfelder, a significant number of courts have agreed that
recklessness suffices to establish defendants' liability. E.g., McLean v. Alexander,
599 F.2d 1190, 1197-98 (3d Cir. 1979); Mansbach v. Prescott, Ball & Turben, 598
F.2d 1017, 1023 (6th Cir. 1979); Edward J. Mawod & Co. v. SEC, 591 F.2d 588,
596 (10th Cir. 1979); Hoffman v. Estabrook & Co., 587 F.2d 509, 516 (1st Cir. 1978);
Sanders v. John Nuveen & Co., 554 F.2d 790, 793 (7th Cir. 1977); Dupuy v. Dupuy,
551 F.2d 1005, 1019-20 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 911 (1977); Peltz v. North-
era Ohio Bank, 430 F. Supp. 382, 383-84 (N.D. Ohio 1976); Rolf v. Blyth Eastman
Dillon & Co., 424 F. Supp. 1021, 1042 (S.D.N.Y. 1977), aff'd in part, remanded in
part, 570 F.2d 38 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1039 (1978); see Note, Reckless-
ness and the Rule 10b-5 Scienter Standard After Hochfelder, 48 Fordham L. Rev.
817, 817-22 (1980); Note, Scienter's Scope and Application in Rule 10b-5 Actions: An
Analysis in Light of Hochfelder, 52 Notre Dame Law. 925 (1977).
33. See Holmes v. Bateson, 583 F.2d 542, 559 n.21 (1st Cir. 1978); Sundstrand
Corp. v. Sun Chem. Corp., 553 F.2d 1033, 104849 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 434
U.S. 875 (1977); Dupuy v. Dupuy, 551 F.2d 1005, 1017-18 (5th Cir.), cert. denied,
434 U.S. 911 (1977); Holdsworth v. Strong, 545 F.2d 687, 693 (10th Cir. 1976), cert.
denied, 430 U.S. 955 (1977); Straub v. Vaisman & Co., 540 F.2d 591, 597 (3d Cir.
1976); McLean v. Alexander, 420 F. Supp. 1057, 1078 (D. Del. 1976). But see Meier
v. Texas Int'l Drilling Funds, Inc., 441 F. Supp. 1056, 1063 (N.D. Cal. 1977)
(plaintiff's diligence considered without regard to defendant's scienter); Alton Box
Board Co. v. Goldman, Sachs & Co., 418 F. Supp. 1149, 1158 (E.D. Mo. 1976)
(same), rev'd on other grounds, 560 F.2d 916 (8th Cir. 1977). See also Wheeler,
supra note 4, at 583; Still a Limitation, supra note 13, at 139.
34. See Dupuy v. Dupuy, 551 F.2d 1005, 1018 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S.
911 (1977); Holdsworth v. Strong, 545 F.2d 687, 693-95 (10th Cir. 1976), cert. de-
nied, 430 U.S. 955 (1977); Straub v. Vaisman & Co., 540 F.2d 591, 597 (3d Cir.
1976); Wheeler, supra note 4, at 575.
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recovery for negligent misrepresentations, but not for intentional
misrepresentations.' Thus, courts have attempted to eliminate the
similarity between due diligence and contributory negligence by
changing the standard of care for plaintiffs. No court, however, has
attempted to justify the use of a due diligence standard as a complete
bar to recovery.
The first decision to reconsider the viability of due diligence was
Straub v. Vaisman & Co.' Addressing Hochfelder's scienter require-
ment, the Third Circuit acknowledged the difficulty inherent in rec-
ognizing a negligence defense to an intentional tort by analogy to the
common law tort of deceit.37 The court observed that, "[u]nder the
common law, once the right to recover for intentional misrepresenta-
tion has been established, lack of care on the part of the recipient in
accepting the representations as true becomes irrelevant so long as
the misrepresentation is not patently false." 3 Straub, however, re-
frained from abrogating the due diligence requirement. It held, in
effect, that a claimant's qualitatively lesser fault could offset a defend-
ant's intentional misconduct and bar recovery when the claimant
failed to act reasonably. 9  Although this formulation is inconsistent
with Straub's rejection of a negligence standard,"° the case is signifi-
cant because the court justified retention of a due diligence require-
35. Dupuy v. Dupuy, 551 F.2d 1005, 1018 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 911
(1977).
36. 540 F.2d 591 (3d Cir. 1976). In Straub, the plaintiff, manager of a European
portfolio management firm, purchased 10,000 shares in Mark I Offset at the recom-
mendation of defendant Vaisman & Co., a broker. Id. at 594. Less than a month
following the stock purchase, Mark I Offset filed for bankruptcy. Id. The trial court
found that defendant had access to "inside" information regarding the imminence of
Mark I's bankruptcy. Id. On appeal, defendants urged that plaintiff should be barred
from recovery because of his failure to inquire into the financial status of the troub-
led company prior to purchase. Id. at 596.
37. Id. at 597. Common law torts, although not determinative, have been found
relevant in interpreting rule 10b-5. See Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores,
421 U.S. 723, 744-45 (1975); Landy v. Federal Deposit Ins. Co., 486 F.2d 139, 169
(3d Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 960 (1974). At common law, the tort of deceit
requires misrepresentation, reliance, scienter, deception, and injury. W. Prosser,
Handbook of the Law of Torts § 105, at 685-86 (4th ed. 1971); Restatement (Second)
of Torts §§ 526-48 (1965).
38. 540 F.2d at 597; see W. Prosser, supra note 37, § 108; Restatement (Second)
of Torts §§ 540, 541 (1965). When plaintiff is misled by a patent falsity, he would be
denied a recovery under common law principles. See Seeger v. Odell, 18 Cal. 2d
409, 415, 115 P.2d 977, 981 (1941); Bean v. Bickley, 187 Iowa 689, 709, 174 N.W.
675, 683 (1919).
39. 540 F.2d at 598.
40. The court's due diligence standard conflicts with its seeming disregard of a
plaintiff's negligence inasmuch as negligence is defined as the failure to exercise that
degree of care that a reasonably careful person would exercise under like circum-
stances. Restatement (Second) of Torts § 282 (1965). The Straub court did not consider
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ment on the policy ground of promoting investor diligence in the
securities markets.4'
The Tenth Circuit disparate result in Holdsworth v. Strong.' The
decision initially noted that, before Hochfelder, a duty of due dili-
gence had barred recovery only in those cases involving negligent
misrepresentations. 43  The court reasoned that, "[i]f the negligence
standard were being applied it might be appropriate to allow due
diligence to be exacted from the victim, but where liability of the
defendant requires proof of intentional misconduct, the exaction of a
due diligence standard from the plaintiff becomes irrational and
unrelated."" The court resolved this analytical obstacle by limiting
the due diligence defense to instances in which the plaintiff has en-
gaged in "gross conduct somewhat comparable to that of
defendant," and by subsuming the notion of a standard of care in
the claimant's requirement of justifiable reliance.6
this issue. It did note, however, that in determining plaintiff's reasonableness, the
court should consider plaintiff's sophistication, access to relevant information, and
whether a fiduciary or other settled business relationship is shown to exist. 540 F.2d
at 598. Sophistication itself, however, would not preclude recovery when a fiduciary
relationship exists. Id.; cf. Stier v. Smith, 473 F.2d 1205, 1207 & n.4 (5th Cir. 1973)
("sophisticated investors, like all others, are entitled to the truth"); Lehigh Valley
Trust Co. v. Central Bank of Jacksonville, 409 F.2d 989, 992 (5th Cir. 1969) C[Tihe
protections and remedies of the Securities Act are not accorded only to those who
fail a battery of information and intelligence tests, but are simply conditioned upon
the misrepresentation of material facts.").
41. 540 F.2d at 597.
42. 545 F.2d 687 (10th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 955 (1977). The case
arose when the Holdsworths sold their shares in a closely-held corporation to Strong,
who held a majority of the corporation's stock. The sale %as prompted by Strong's
misrepresentation of the company's financial future and by his assertions that the
company would be unable to pay dividends. Id. at 689. In response to plaintiff's
10b-5 claim, Strong contended that Mr. Holdsworth, a corporate "insider", an attor-
ney, and an accountant, had a duty to ascertain the corporation's financial status prior
to selling his stock. Id. at 692.
43. id. at 692-93; see Frigitemp Corp. v. Financial Dynamics Fund, Inc., 524
F.2d 275, 282 (2d Cir. 1975); White v. Abrams, 495 F.2d 724, 730 (9th Cir. 1974);
Arber v. Essex Wire Corp., 490 F.2d 414, 419-21 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S.
830 (1974); Myzel v. Fields, 386 F.2d 718, 734-35 (8th Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 390
U.S. 951 (1968).
44. 545 F.2d at 692. The court also noted that, when plaintiff must establish a
defendant's scienter and defendant is permitted to raise a plaintiff's negligence as an
absolute defense, "the [10b-5] action lies only in an extraordinary case." Id. at 693.
45. Id. at 693.
46. The court, following the common law principle that a plaintiff may not justifi-
ably rely on a palpably false representation, ruled that the Holdsworths' reliance was
justified because their relationship with the defendant was "quasi-fiduciary" in na-
ture, giving them no reason to doubt his honesty. Id. at 696-97. Subsequent to the
publication of its decision, the Tenth Circuit's reasoning in Holdstrorth was endorsed
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Yet another analytic thread is to be found in the Fifth Circuit's
decision in Dupuy v. Dupuy.47  Rejecting classification of due dili-
gence in the context of materiality,4 reliance,49 or defendant's variable
duty of disclosure,-10 the Dupuy court commenced its analysis by con-
sidering due diligence as a separate element of plaintiff's case."' The
court then rejected the negligence standard as a bar to recovery
based on the tort analogy, concluding that, subsequent to Hochfelder,
there was less need for a limit on a defendant's liability. 2 In support
of the tort analogy,3 the court cited two principles. First, the "policy
by the Seventh Circuit in Sundstrand Corp. v. Sun Chem. Corp., 553 F.2d 1033,
1048 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 875 (1977). Other cases have also followed this
reasoning. E.g., Alton Box Board Co. v. Goldman, Sachs & Co., 418 F. Supp. 1149,
1158 (E.D. Mo. 1976); Carr v. New York Stock Exch., Inc., 414 F. Supp. 1292,
1301-02 (N.D. Cal. 1976).
47. 551 F.2d 1005 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 911 (1977). In Dupuy, two
brothers, Clarence and Milton Dupuy, each held 47% of the stock in a closely-held
corporation. Clarence had gradually restricted his ailing younger brother, Milton, to
a position of ignorance and dependence. Id. at 1008-10. Milton averred that Clarence
had induced him to sell his 47% share for $10,000 when its real value was $500,000.
Id. at 1011. At trial, the jury found for the plaintiff. The trial judge, however, en-
tered judgment n.o.v., finding no basis for the jury's determination that the plaintiff
had exercised due diligence. Id. at 1008.
48. Id. at 1014-16.
49. 551 F.2d at 1014-16; see note 20 supra and accompanying text.
50. 551 F.2d at 1014-16; see note 22 supra and accompanying text.
51. 551 F.2d at 1014.
52. Id. at 1017, 1020.
53. The tort analogy rests on two tenuous premises. The first premise is that
Hochfelder allows for recovery exclusively in cases of intentional misconduct. The
Court, however, expressly declined to consider whether recklessness would suffice
for the imposition of liability. Ernst & Ernst v, Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 193 &
n.12 (1976). The second premise is the purportedly determinative character of the
tort analogy itself. E.g., Dupuy v. Dupuy, 551 F.2d 1005, 1018 (5th Cir.), cert.
denied, 434 U.S. 911 (1977); Holdsworth v. Strong, 545 F.2d 687, 693-95 (10th Cir.
1976), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 955 (1977); Straub v. Vaisman & Co., 540 F.2d 591,
597 (3d Cir. 1976); see Wheeler, supra note 4, at 575; Still a Limitation, supra note
13, at 134-35. Tort analogies, although instructive in fashioning the contours of 10b-5
liability are not determinative. Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S.
723, 744-45 (1975) ("[T]he typical fact situation in which the classic tort of misrepre-
sentation and deceit evolved was light years away from the world of commercial
transactions to which Rule 10b-5 is applicable."). Notwithstanding, were these prem-
ises to be accepted arguendo, it would not be improper to support the imposition of
some due care burden. Dean Prosser reached a similar conclusion when he provided
in several tentative drafts of the Second Restatement of Torts that, even in cases of
intentional misrepresentation, a claimant could be barred from recovery when he is
"on notice" of the falsity of a misrepresentation and blindly disregards such notice.
Restatement (Second) of Torts § 540 (Tent. Draft No. 11, 1965); id. (Tent. Draft No.
10, 1964); 42 ALI Proceedings 327, 329 (1965); 41 ALI Proceedings 509 (1964); Causa-
tion supra note 13, at 1226-30. Although Dean Prosser's proposal was ultimately
rejected by the American Law Institute after considerable debate, see 42 ALl Pro-
ceedings 331 (1965), a due care requirement has been effectively included in the
Second Restatement's requirement that a claimant's reliance on a fraudulent misrep-
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of deterring intentional misconduct outweighs that of deterring negli-
gent behavior."'  Second, comparative culpability influences the de-
termination of who should bear the loss occasioned by a fraud and,
thus, dictates a shift of the loss from the victim.-% The court but-
tressed these considerations with a reading of the Securities Acts that
favored the deterrence of fraudulent conduct over the promotion of
investor diligence. Accordingly, the court held that a plaintiff may
not recover only when he fails to exercise care "in disregard of a risk
known to him or so obvious that he must be taken to have been
aware of it, and so great as to make it highly probable that harm
would follow." ' Ultimately, the standard established by Dupuzy is
one of recklessness.
5s
Until recently, the Second Circuit was the only court to retain a
duty of due diligence premised on plaintiff's negligence. The leading
case, Hirsch v. du Pont, s stated in dicta that a sophisticated plaintiff
would be estopped from asserting a 10b-5 claim when he failed to
ascertain available material facts.Y A recent decision, however, Mal-
resentation be "justifiable" as a prerequisite to recovery. Restatement (Second) of
Torts § 537 (1965). Thus, "[t]he recipient of a fraudulent misrepresentation is not
justified in relying upon its truth if he knows that it is false or its falsity is obvious to
him." Id. § 541. These comments, however, need not suggest the incorporation of a
due diligence element into the requirement of plaintiff's reliance in private lOb-5
actions. Such an approach, as Dupuy correctly maintains, is problematic in applica-
tion. Dupuy v. Dupuy, 551 F.2d 1005, 1014-16 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 911
(1977). The foregoing commends the consideration of some due diligence require-
ment as an element in determining the relative culpability of the parties for the
litigated transaction without "slavish judicial adherence to verbal formulations and
scant attention to [the] underlying reality." Causation, supra note 13, at 1252.
54. 551 F.2d at 1018.
55. Id.
56. Id.; see Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 195, 206 (1976); note 29
supra and accompanying text.
57. 551 F.2d at 1020.
58. Id; accord, Paul F. Newton & Co. v. Texas Commerce Bank, 630 F.2d 1111,
1121-22 (5th Cir. 1980); Meyers v. Moody, 475 F. Supp. 232, 24647 (N.D. Tex.
1979). See also Croy v. Campbell, 624 F.2d 709, 716 (5th Cir. 19S0) (Dupuy cited
with approval). In Altschuler v. Cohen, 471 F. Supp. 1372 (S.D. Tex. 1979), how-
ever, the court held a sophisticated investor to what appears to be a negligence
standard when he failed to uncover a highly complex fraudulent commission scheme.
Id. at 1376-77, 1384.
59. 553 F.2d 750 (2d Cir. 1977). Hirsch concerned a 10b-5 action brought by
Hirsch & Co. against F.I. du Pont for misrepresentations about du Pont's financial
well-being made during a merger. Id. at 754.
60. Id. at 762. The court did not expressly reach the issue of investor diligence
because it considered the undisclosed information immaterial to the litigation. Id.
The court stated that "[t]he securities laws were not enacted to protect sophisticated
businessmen from their own errors of judgment." Id. at 763. Because the Hirsch
court did not analyze Hochfelder and mentioned due diligence in dicta, the case's
precedential value is questionable. A subsequent case, however, Ed%ards & Hanly
v. Wells Fargo Sec. Clearance Corp., 458 F. Supp. 1110, 1123 (S.D.N.Y. 1978),
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Iis v. Bankers Trust Co.,"1 has seemingly aligned the Second Circuit
with the Fifth by concluding that a claimant's burden in a section
10(b) action should be "simply to negate recklessness when the defend-
ant puts that in issue, not to establish [his own] due care."2 The
court, however, declined to overrule Hirsch. Although maintaining
that the case should be limited to its facts, Judge Friendly stated that
he had "no quarrel whatever" with its result.3
The wide divergence of the post-Hochfelder standards64 under-
scores the insufficiency of any attempt to establish an arbitrary de-
marcation of prohibited behavior that results in dismissal of a
plaintiff's claim. Regardless of which standard is applied, the use of
rev'd on other grounds, 602 F.2d 478 (2d Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1045
(1980), cited Hirsh with approval. See also Greene v. Emersons, Ltd., [1979-80
Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 97,266, at 96,868 (S.D.N.Y. 1980) (Ed-
wards & Hanly cited with approval); Bradford Sec. Processing Servs., Inc. v. County
Fed. Say. & Loan, 474 F. Supp. 957, 965 (S.D.N.Y. 1979) (plaintiff's "negligence"
sufficient to bar recovery because he is in the "best position to know what was
happening"); Rice v. Baron, [1979-80 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH)
97,200, at 96,583 (S.D.N.Y. 1979) (plaintiff was negligent because he ignored
financial statements that gave him notice of a possible fraud).
61. 615 F.2d 68 (2d Cir. 1980). Mallis involved a complex securities transaction
in which the plaintiff purchased shares in Equity National Industries, Inc. and subse-
quently learned that they contained transfer restrictions that rendered them value-
less. Id. at 71-74.
62. Id. at 79 (footnote omitted). Although the court's language appears to indicate
that the plaintiff's failure to exercise due care is an affirmative defense to be raised
and proved by the defendant, the court adopted Dupuy's approach, concluding that
the plaintiff must negate his own recklessness as an element of the cause of action.
Id. at 79 n. 10.
63. Id. at 79. The court characterized the plaintiff's conduct in Hirsch as going
"far beyond negligence." Id. It acknowledged in a footnote, however, that the "facts
in Edwards & Hanly would have led to dismissal under the Dupuy standard." Id. at
79 n.9. Mallis' reasoning has been endorsed in Greenfield v. Flying Diamond Oil
Corp., [1979-80 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 97,298, at 97,043
(S.D.N.Y. 1980). But see Verace v. New York Stock Exch., Inc., [Current Transfer
Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 97,575, at 98,043 (S.D.N.Y. 1980) (Edwards &
Hanly, not Mallis, cited with respect to plaintiff's diligence).
64. The divergent formulations of due diligence present formidable analytical dif-
ficulties. See Dupuy v. Dupuy, 551 F.2d 1005, 1014-18 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 434
U.S. 911 (1977). For instance, the Fifth Circuit noted that a variable duty standard,
which varies the defendant's duty to disclose in relation to the status of the plaintiff,
may lead to "gamesmanship" by defendants as they adjust their degree of disclosure
to the status of the victim. Id. at 1015; Wheeler, supra note 4, at 591. Similarly, the
Dupuy court assailed the "materiality-reliance approach" of the First and Tenth Cir-
cuits as presenting a problem of "consistency of application." 551 F.2d at 1015. Be-
cause the Supreme Court held that proof of reliance in 10b-5 actions is unnecessary
in cases involving omissions, Affiliated Ute Citizens v United States, 406 U.S. 128
(1972), an approach that subsumes the due diligence element into the plaintiff's re-
liance requirement would "remove from plaintiffs the responsibility of exercising due
care to protect their interests in omission cases." 551 F.2d at 1015-16.
DUE DILIGENCE
due diligence as a liability-denying rule is at cross purposes with the
policies that the requirement is intended to promote.
I. A PROPOSED DUE DILIGENCE REQUIREMENT
A. Due Diligence as a Liability-Reducing Rule
The notion of a due diligence requirement is a sensible one. It
promotes stability in the securities markets through reasoned invest-
ment-makings and reflects the equitable notion that only those who
have pursued their own interests with care and good faith should
qualify for the judicially created 10b-5 remedy.6 Due diligence need
not, however, be formulated in a manner that denies all liability for a
defendant's intentional misconduct when the plaintiff recklessly or in-
tentionally misbehaves. Such a formulation fails to recognize the lack
of moral parity between litigants with respect to securities fraud."
The conduct of a defrauding defendant is "egoistical" and "antisocial"
in character;6 his conduct is directed at the infliction of injury on
ascertainable victims in the marketplace." In contrast, a claimant's
behavior is conduct that "runs an unjustified risk to the actor himself,
rather than to others."" Accordingly, it is specious to weigh the
claimant's fault with that of the defendant without regard for the
65. See Dupuy v. Dupuy, 551 F.2d 1005, 1014 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S.
911 (1977); Wheeler, supra note 4, at 564-65; Due Diligence, supra note 13, at 760-
61.
66. See Dupuy v. Dupuy, 551 F.2d 1005, 1014 (5th Cir., cert. denied, 434 U.S.
911 (1977); Clement A. Evans & Co. v. McAlpine, 434 F.2d 100, 104 (5th Cir. 1970),
cert. denied, 402 U.S. 988 (1971); City Nat'l. Bank v. Vanderboom, 422 F.2d 221,
230 n.10 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 399 U.S. 905 (1970); Wheeler, supra note 4, at
568-72.
67. See, e.g., Mallis v. Bankers Trust Co., 615 F.2d 68, 78-79 (2d Cir. 1980);
Sundstrand Corp. v. Sun Chem. Corp., 553 F.2d 1033, 1048 (7th Cir.), cert. denied,
434 U.S. 875 (1977); Holdsworth v. Strong, 545 F.2d 687, 692-95 (10th Cir. 1976),
cert. denied, 430 U.S. 955 (1977).
68. Schwartz, Contributory and Comparative Negligence: A Reappraisal, 87 Yale
L.J. 697, 722 (1978).
69. This is the basis of intentionally tortious conduct. See W. Prosser, supra note
37, § 8, at 31-34 ("intent to bring about a result which %vill invade the interests of
another in a way that the law will not sanction.").
70. Schwartz, supra note 68, at 722. In support of the abrogation of contributory
negligence-like formulations such as the due diligence rule, Professor Schwartz has
argued that the "foolish" or "stupid" behavior of plaintiffs should not preclude a
negligence judgment against an antisocial defendant. Id. at 722-26. This rationale is
all the more applicable to cases involving intentional wrongdoing such as lob-5 viola-
tions. Additionally, certain non-diligent investor behavior may be beneficial to the
market. For example, Professor Posner regards the behavior of speculators as benefi-
cial because it "serves the salutary purpose of enabling rapid adjustments of prices to
current values." R. Posner, Economic Analysis of Law 333-34 (2d ed. 1977). The
information that speculators uncover diffuses rapidly throughout the market enabling
other traders to adjust as rapidly as possible to the changed conditions unearthed by
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qualitative differences involved. Moreover, a liability-denying rule is
equally suspect from the perspective of securities policy. Rule 10b-5,
by compensating defrauded claimants, creates a deterrent effect 7' by
making violations unprofitable for defendants.' The imposition of a
liability-denying rule "undercuts this deterrent effect because fewer
violators are forced to return their fraudulent gains." 7 3
The present rule unnecessarily phrases liability in antipodal terms:
a claimant is either victorious or vanquished; a defendant is either
absolved or condemned.74 The notion of due diligence would be
neither "impaired [n]or compromised were it deployed in support of
a liability-reducing rule rather than a liability-denying rule."'  Such
a result would be consistent with jurisprudential principles and com-
mon sense. 76 As one commentator has observed, when possible "the
the speculator. Id. Professor Posner maintains that "society buys this important social
service at a low price." Id. at 334 n.4. See also H. Manne, Economic Policy and the
Regulation of Corporate Securities, 202-04 (1969); H. Manne, Insider Trading and
the Stock Market, 107, 108 (1966). John Maynard Keynes observed whimsically that
"[t]he game of professional investment is intolerably boring and overexacting to any-
one who is entirely exempt from the gambling instinct." J. M. Keynes, The General
Theory of Employment, Interest and Money 157 (1949).
71. See Globus v. Law Research Serv., Inc., 418 F.2d 1276, 1288 (2d Cir. 1969),
cert. denied, 397 U.S. 913 (1970). Deterrence, not punishment, is the basis of the
rule. The Securities Exchange Act of 1934 specifically precludes an award of punitive
damages. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, § 28, 15 U.S.C. § 78 bb (1976) (limitation
on amount recoverable to actual damages sustained). Courts also have refrained from
awarding punitive damages. See deHaas v. Empire Petroleum Co., 435 F.2d 1223,
1230 (10th Cir. 1970); Green v. Wolf Corp., 406 F.2d 291, 302 (2d Cir. 1968), cert.
denied, 395 U.S. 977 (1969). The reticence of courts with respect to the award of
punitive damages may be rooted in the notion that, in certain instances, "relatively
minimal involvement might nevertheless lead to tremendous damage exposure."
Wheeler, supra note 4, at 585. One commentator has suggested that there is no
intrinsic connection between the private enforcement action and the deterrence of
fraudulent conduct because other specific SEC provisions were legislatively enacted
to deter fraudulent conduct. Wheeler, supra note 4, at 585-86. Sections 21 and 32 of
the 1934 Act provide for injunctions and criminal penalties to combat violations of
the Act. See Securities Exchange Act of 1934, §§ 21, 32, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78(u), 78(ff)
(1976). It would be unwise, however, to assume that the prospect of exacting a large
damage recovery in a private action with the zeal characteristic of an aggrieved plain-
tiff is not, in practice, a substantial deterrent.
72. Abrogation of Due Care, supra note 13, at 421-22.
73. Id. at 432. "A due care requirement [that bars a recovery by plaintiff] might
even encourage intentional wrongdoing since potential defrauders may find it profit-
able to perpetrate securities fraud, realizing that mere negligence on the part of the
plaintiff will allow them to retain the fruits of the fraudulent transaction." Id.
74. In so doing, the rule risks compounding the unfairness by permitting the
"break point" of recovery to turn on the questionable judgment of a lay jury.
Schwartz, supra note 68, at 727; see W. Prosser, supra note 37, § 67, at 438; A.
Strick, Injustice for All 97 (1977).
75. Schwartz, supra note 68, at 725.
76. See id. at 725-26.
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law's preferred course is to seek an accommodating rule or result that
is able to reduce, or if possible to resolve, the original tension" be-
tween the underlying policy and its expression.' A preferable due
diligence formulation is one that distributes liability in proportion to
the responsibility of each actor for the tortious injury. ' The basis for
such a formulation may be drawn from the emerging doctrine of com-
parative fault in tort.
B. Due Diligence and Comparative Fault
The rule of negligence traditionally allocates the entire burden of
loss to one party when both parties usually are culpable to some
degree."' Similarly, contributory negligence operates to bar an in-
jured party's recovery without inquiry into the extent of each party's
deviation from a societal norm.60 Although the common law sought
to ameliorate the harsh effect of contributory negligence through the
formulation of such judge-made exceptions as the "emergency
doctrine" 8 or the "last clear chance doctrine," ' , these exceptions also
were premised on an "all or nothing" approach that granted or de-
nied recovery without regard for the relative fault of the parties.8 '
77. Id. at 726. Reluctance to restructure the present due diligence formulation
may stem from an inability to distinguish the "rule" of due diligence from the "prin-
ciple" it represents: the deterrence of negligent investor behavior and equitable
limitation on defendant's liability. Rules merely embody principles. They are not
principles and they may be reformulated so as to promote desirable behavior. See R.
Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously 24-29 (1977) (distinguishing legal "rules" from legal
"principles"); H. Hart, The Concept of Law 129-30 (1961) (same).
78. See generally W. Hirsch, Law and Economics 144 (1979); Schwartz, supra
note 68, at 727.
79. See W. Prosser, supra note 37, § 67, at 433.
80. Id. Contributory negligence, as traditionally formulated, bars the plaintiff en-
tirely from recovery even though his fault may be slight in comparison to that of the
defendant. See H. Woods, Comparative Fault § 1:3, at 7 (1978). This fundamental
unfairness is compounded by the plaintiff's relative inability to shoulder the financial
burden of the loss. Hoffman v. Jones, 280 So. 2d 431, 437 (Fla. 1973); W. Prosser,
supra note 37, § 67, at 433.
81. The emergency doctrine effectively excuses the contributory negligence of an
actor when he is suddenly and unexpectedly deprived of a reasonable opportunity for
deliberation and considered decision. Prosser, supra note 37, § 33, at 16S-70 & n.11.
An actor is not excused, however, when the emergency is attributable to his own
negligence, id. at 170 n. 12, or when the emergency should have been anticipated by
the actor. Id. at 170 nn.16-17.
82. The doctrine of the last clear chance holds that if the defendant has the last
opportunity to avoid the harm complained of, the plaintiff's negligence is not a prox-
imate cause of the result and may be disregarded. W. Prosser, supra note 37, § 66,
at 427. See generally James, Last Clear Chance: A Transitional Doctrine, 47 Yale
L.J. 704 (1938); MacIntyre, The Rationale of Last Clear Chance, 53 Harv. L. Rev.
1225 (1940).
83. See H. Woods, Comparative Fault § 1:8, at 15 (1978); Prosser, Comparative
Negligence, 51 Mich. L. Rev. 465, 474 (1953) ("[Tlhe real objection to the last clear
chance is that it seeks to alleviate the hardships of contributory negligence by shift-
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From its origins in civil law jurisdictions and admiralty tribunals, the
doctrine of comparative faultm arose in reply to the perceived harsh-
ness of the contributory negligence formulation. 3 In its simplest
form, comparative fault allocates a percentage of fault for tortiously
caused injuries to each party and assesses damages in accord with
these percentages."' Thus, the liability of each actor more accurately
reflects his responsibility for the result.
At present, three distinct forms of comparative fault exist.' "Pure"
comparative fault represents the maximum relaxation of the common
law doctrine of contributory negligence." Under a "pure" rule, a
claimant may recover from a wrongdoer, regardless of the extent of
the claimant's own fault, if the other party's conduct was a cause of
the claimant's injury."9 An alternative formulation, "modified" com-
ing the entire loss due to the fault of both parties from the plaintiff to the defendant.
It is still no more reasonable to charge the defendant with the plaintiff's share of the
consequences of his fault than to charge the plaintiff with the defendant's ....").
84. "'Comparative [fault]' properly refers only to a comparison of the fault of the
plaintiff with that of the defendant. It does not necessarily result in any division of
damages, but may permit full recovery by the plaintiff notwithstanding his contribu-
tory negligence." Prosser, Comparative Negligence, 51 Mich. L. Rev. 465, 465 n.2
(1953).
85. See Henry, Why Not Comparative Negligence in Washington?, in Compara-
tive Negligence 8 (W. Schwartz ed. 1970). "It early developed that hard-headed ship
owners recognized the harshness of the rule of contributory negligence. A ship owner
whose vessel was sunk, suffering a loss of vessel and cargo of a thousand pounds,
in a collision with another vessel whose damage was slight, could not bear to stand
the entire loss where both vessels were negligent." Id. at 10. See generally W. Pros-
ser, supra note 37, § 67, at 433-39; H. Woods, Comparative Fault §§ 4:1-4:6 (1978).
86. See Committee on Continuing Legal Education, Chicago Bar Association,
Comparative Negligence 3-21 (1968); Defense Research Institute, Inc., Comparative
Negligence Primer 7-10 (1975) [hereinafter cited as Defense Research]; W. Prosser,
supra note 37, § 67 at 434-39; V. Schwartz, Comparative Negligence § 3.2, at 46
(1974); H. Woods, Comparative Fault § 1.1-11 (1978).
87. Defense Research, supra note 86, at 9.
88. Id.
89. See H. Woods, Comparative Fault § 4.1, at 77 (1978). "In other words, a
plaintiff damaged in the sum of $100,000 who is 99% negligent may theoretically
recover one thousand dollars on his claim." Id. Because of the adoption of the "pure"
form of comparative fault in New York, California, and Florida, three of the nation's
most populous states, "pure" comparative fault now affects more litigants than any
other system. Id; see Li v. Yellow Cab Co., 13 Cal. 3d 804, 810, 119 Cal. Rptr. 858,
862, 532 P.2d 1226, 1230 (1975); Hoffman v. Jones, 280 So. 2d 431, 438 (Fla. 1973);
N.Y. Civ. Prac. Law § 1411 (McKinney 1976). Other states following the "pure" rule
are Alaska, Kaatz v. Alaska, 540 P.2d 1037, 1049 (1975); Mississippi, Miss. Code
Ann. § 11-7-15 (1972), Rhode Island, R. I. Gen. Laws § 9-20-4 (Supp. 1980), and
Washington, Wash. Rev. Code Ann. § 4.22.010 (Supp. 1980). On the federal level,
the Federal Employers Liability Act, 45 U.S.C. §§ 51-60 (1976), and the Federal




parative fault, denotes tnwo distinct systems, each distinguished by the
point at which the claimant will be barred from recovery. The "not
greater than" or "fifty percent" system allows for the recovery of re-
duced damages when the fault attributable to the claimant does not
exceed fifty percent of the total fault.9' The "not as great as" system
bars a claimant from all recovery when the percentage of fault attrib-
utable to his conduct is equal to fifty percent of the total fault. A
final formulation of comparative fault, the "slight versus gross" sys-
tem, exists in a few jurisdictions. This system permits the recovery of
damages only when the claimant's fault is determined to be "slight"
in comparison with the "gross" culpability of the defendant.Y
90. Defense Research, supra note 86, at 9; H. Woods, Comparative Fault § 4.3.
at 82 (1978).
91. See Defense Research, supra note 86, at 9; H. Woods. Comparative Fault
§ 4.3, at 82 (1978). This system has been adopted by the following jurisdictions:
Arkansas, Ark. Stat. Ann. § 27.1765 (1979); Colorado, Colo. Rev. Stat. § 13-21-111
(1973); Idaho, Idaho Code § 6-801 (1979); Kansas, Kan. Stat. Ann. § 60-258ta) t1979),
Minnesota, Minn. Stat. Ann. § 604.01 (West Supp. 1980); North Dakota, N.D. Cent.
Code § 9-10-07 (1975); Oklahoma, Okla. Stat. Ann. tit. 23, § 13 (West Supp. 1980-
1981); Utah, Utah Code Ann. § 78-27-37 (1977); Wyoming, Wyo. Stat. § 1-1-109
(1977).
92. See Defense Research, supra note 86, at 10 (1975); H. Woods, Comparative
Fault § 4.4, at 84-85 (1978). The following jurisdictions have adopted this approach:
Connecticut, Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 52-572h (West Supp. 1980); Hawaii, Hawaii
Rev. Stat. § 663-31 (Supp. 1976); Massachussets. Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. ch. 231 § 85
(West 1974); Montana, Mont. Rev. Codes Ann. § 58-607.1 (Supp. 1977); Nevada,
Nev. Rev. Stat. § 41.141 (1979); New Hampshire, N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 507.7a
(Supp. 1973); New Jersey, N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2a 15-61 (West Supp. 1973); Texas, Tex.
Rev. Civ. Stat. Ann. art. 2212a (Vernon Supp. 1980-1981); Vermont, Vt. Stat. Ann. tit.
12 § 1036 (1970). The difference between the two systems may be illustrated by the
following example. Plaintiff's damages arising from an automobile collision with a
negligent driver are assessed at S10,000. Under the "not as great as" system, plaintiff
may exact a recovery diminished by his proportion of fault provided that damages
attributable to his fault do not exceed $4,999, 49% of the total damages assessed.
Under the "not greater than" system, plaintiff may exact a recovery diminished by
his proportion of fault provided that damages attributable to his fault do not exceed
$5,000, 50% of total damages assessed. When damages attributed to plaintiff's fault
exceed $5,000 (or in excess of 50% of total damages assessed), plaintiff would be
barred from recovering under either system. The rationale underlying both systems
has been criticized as shifting "the lottery aspect of the contributory' negligence rule
to a different ground." Li. v. Yelow Cab Co., 13 Cal. 3d 804, 827, 532 P.2d 1226,
1242, 119 Cal. Rptr. 858, 874-75 (1975) (footnote omitted).
93. See Defense Research, supra note 86, at 10; H. Woods, Comparative Fault
§ 4.5, at 85 (1978). The following jurisdictions have adopted the "slight versus gross"
system: Georgia, Ga. Code Ann. § 105-603 (1968); Nebraska, Neb. Rev. Stat. § '25-
1151 (1979); South Dakota, S.D. Comp. Laws Ann. § 20-9-2 (1979); Tennessee,
Bejach v. Colby, 141 Tenn. 686, 214 S.W. 869, 870 (1919); Louisville & N. R. Co. v.
Cheatham, 118 Tenn. 160, 100 S.W. 902, 909 (1907).
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Of these systems, "pure" comparative fault offers the only equita-
ble model 14 because it is the only formulation that adequately re-
flects the basic premise of comparative fault: "the plaintiff should not
be barred from recovery by his own negligence; rather, his negli-
gence should serve only to reduce his recovery."" Alternative for-
mulations are inconsistent with this idea because a plaintiff's negli-
gence may, if sufficiently great, bar his recovery rather than reduce
it.6 One commentator has observed that
[t]he "pure" form of comparative negligence seems the superior
rule of apportionment. It is difficult to justify discriminating be-
tween the case in which the plaintiff is a little more negligent than
the defendant and the case in which the defendant is a little more
negligent than the plaintiff. Apportionment seems a fairer solution
in both cases than making one party bear all his own loss. More-
over, in one sense, the more limited form of comparative negligence
would only aggravate this unfhir discrimination if it really worked
according to its theory, because the party a little more negligent
would bear all his own loss plus a little more than half the loss
flowing from the injury to the other."
Similarly, Dean Prosser has rejected "modified" systems of compara-
tive fault, characterizing them as "more or less obvious [political]
compromises . . . remarkable neither for soundness in principle nor
success in operation." '
Because a "pure" system of comparative fault permits plaintiffs to
recover some damages despite bearing some responsibility for their
injuries, its extension to 10b-5 cases would transform due diligence
from a liability-denying rule to a liability-reducing rule. The introduc-
tion of comparative fault into the private 10b-5 action is problematic,
however, because of the general resistance by courts to apply compar-
ative fault principles to intentional torts." This resistance may be
94. V. Schwartz, Comparative Negligence 349 (1974); Prosser, Comparative
Negligence, 41 Cal. L. Rev. 1, 21-25 (1953).
95. Pearson, Apportionment of Losses Under Comparative Fault Laws-An
Analysis of the Alternatives, 40 La. L. Rev. 343, 351 (1980); see Fleming, Foreword
Comparative Negligence At Last-By Judicial Choice, 64 Cal. L. Rev. 239, 249
(1976).
96. See Pearson, supra note 95, at 350-51. "[The adoption of pure comparative
fault] is justified because the basic reason for the existence of the doctrine of compar-
ative negligence is social justice and a modified form which denies such justice in
some cases produces only modified justice." Id.; see Lawler v. City of Park Falls, 35
Wis.2d 308, 316, 151 N.W.2d 68, 72 (1967); Bielski v. Schulze, 16 Wis.2d 1, 10-11,
114 N.W.2d 105, 109-10 (1962).
97. Keeton, Comment on Maid v. Frelk, 21 Vand. L. Rev. 906, 911 (1968).
98. Prosser, Comparative Negligence, 51 Mich. L. Rev. 465, 484 (1953).
99. See V. Schwartz, Comparative Negligence § 5.2, at 101 (1974 & Supp. 1978);
H. Woods, Comparative Fault § 7.1, at 159 (1978 & Supp. 1980); Comment, Coin-
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intensified by a rule that diminishes recoveries of negligent plaintiffs.
Nevertheless, the rationale for the resistance is unjustified and should
be rejected for several reasons. First, contrary to the basic premise of
the tort analogy, a plaintiff's negligence and a defendant's intentional
wrongdoing can be compared. The two concepts can be viewed as
points on a continuum of fault instead of two distinct types of fault."°
Second, recent developments in the law of contribution and post-
Hochfelder reformulations of the due diligence standard provide a
basis for incorporating comparative fault notions into securities fraud
litigation."10 Finally, application of comparative fault to 10b-5 cases is
economically efficient and consistent with the purposes of the private
action. "
parative Fault and Intentional Torts, 12 Loyola of L. A. L. Rev. 179, 182-84 (1978)
[hereinafter cited as Intentional Torts]. This unwillingness by the courts is attributed
to the inapplicability of contributory negligence, a predecessor concept, to inten-
tional torts, see W. Prosser, supra note 37, § 65, at 425-27, and the notion that plaintiffs
negligence and defendant's intentional wrongdoing are different types of fault, as
opposed to different points on a continuum of fault, and are, therefore, not compara-
ble. W. Prosser, supra note 37, § 65, at 426.
100. See note 53 supra. Rule 10b-5, however, must be read flexibly to permit the
fullest realization of its potential as an enforcement mechanism. Superintendent of
Ins. v. Banker's Life & Cas. Co., 404 U.S. 6, 12 (1971). Consequently, the introduc-
tion of comparative fault should not be deferred because of the analogization of 10b-5
to the tort of deceit. The tort analog), is limited at best and certainly not determina-
tive. Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 731-32 (1975); see note
53 supra. The extension of comparative fault to cases alleging strict liability suggests
that fault of different types may be compared. See, e.g., Stueve v. American Honda
Motors Co., 457 F. Supp. 740, 752 (D. Kan. 1978); Murray v. Beloit Power Sys.,
Inc., 450 F. Supp. 1145, 1146 (D.V.I. 1978), aff'd, 610 F.2d 149 (3d Cir. 1979);
Sturm, Ruger & Co. v. Day, 594 P.2d 38, 42 (Alaska 1979); Daly v. General Motors
Co., 20 Cal. 3d 725, 734-37, 575 P.2d 1162, 1165-69, 144 Cal. Rptr. 380, 383-84
(1978); Ransome v. Wisconsin Elec. Power Co., 87 Wis. 2d 605, 619-20, 275 N.W.2d
641, 647-48 (1979). See also V. Schwartz, Comparative Negligence § 12.7 (1974); H.
Woods, Comparative Fault § 14:49 (1978); Intentional Torts. supra note 99, at 185-
86. See also Homburger, The 1975 New York Judicial Conference Package: Class
Actions and Comparative Negligence, 25 Buffalo L. Rev. 415, 434 n.69 (1976)
("Under the sweeping language of New York's statute, apportionment of damages
appears to be authorized even though defendant is charged wvith intentional wrong-
doing in rare cases where the plaintiff's culpable conduct %%-as a substantial factor in
producing the harm."). This view has been hailed as "the wave of the future ...
permitting the decision of the jury to be rendered less on legal niceties and more on
a comparison of the total conduct of the litigants." H. Woods, Comparative Fault §
4.6, at 90 (1978).
101. See notes 103-16 infra and accompanying text.
102. Deterrence of intentional wrongdoing is enhanced by the application of com-
parative fault. A defendant is deterred by the heightened availability of a judgment
on the merits. Moreover, the reduction of damages possible under a comparative
fault formulation equally deters fraudulent defendant conduct by promoting investor
diligence and thus depriving defendant of a gullible victim. Furthermore, unlike cer-
tain kinds of intentional wrongdoing that cannot be avoided by a watchful plaintiff,
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1. Contribution
In contrast to indemnification "~ among defendants in 10b-5 litiga-
tion, which has been rejected as contrary to public policy, 0 4
contribution "0 is a viable method of apportioning damages for secur-
ities violations among joint tortfeasors without "absolving one at the
expense of the other." 106 For some time, pro-rata contribution 107 was
regarded as the only acceptable method of contribution. °0 Recent
decisions, however, have endorsed, if not effected, alternative means
of contribution."6 One decision, McLean v. Alexander, 11 recognized
a continuum of "prohibited behavior between negligence and specific
intent to defraud" in 10b-5 actions."' Thus, because there was a
most securities fraud can be avoided by the diligence of plaintiff. By failing to con-
sider the fault of plaintiff in apportioning damages, the present rule deters fraudulent
conduct by punishing the defendant and not by compensating the victim. Compensa-
tion, not punishment, is the goal of the private 10b-5 action. See 15 U.S.C. § 78b
(1976) (actual damages recoverable).
103. Indemnification entails a shift of the loss arising from a tortious event from
one tortfeasor who has been compelled to pay to another who, for equitable reasons,
should bear it instead. See W. Prosser, supra note 37, § 51, at 310.
104. See, e.g., Premier Corp. v. Economic Research Analysts, Inc., 578 F.2d 551,
555 (4th Cir. 1978); Globus v. Law Research Serv., Inc., 418 F.2d 1276, 1288 (2d
Cir. 1969), cert. denied. 397 U.S. 913 (1970); McLean v. Alexander, 449 F. Supp.
1251, 1266-67 (D. Del. [978), rev'd on other grounds, 599 F.2d 1190 (3d Cir, 1979);
Odette v. Shearson, Hammill & Co., 394 F. Supp. 946, 954-55 (S.D.N.Y. 1975).
105. Contribution entails the distribution of losses among tortfeasors by requiring
each to pay his proportionate share for the loss caused. See Prosser, supra note 37, §
50, at 310.
106. McLean v. Alexander, 449 F. Supp. 1251, 1266-67 (D.Del. 1978), rev'd on
other grounds, 599 F.2d 1190 (3d Cir. 1979). Contribution may be obtained from
joint tortfeasors even if one of them is not a defendant. Jacobs, 10b-5 Developments
- Who Can Sue and Who Is Liable, in Tenth Annual Institute on Securities Reg-
ulation 477 (A. Fleischer, Jr., M. Lipton, and R. Stevenson, Jr., eds. 1978)
[hereinafter cited as 10b-5 Developments]. See generally Index Fund, Inc. v. Ilogo-
pian, 417 F. Supp. 738, 743-44 (S.D.N.Y. 1976); B & B Investment Club, Inc. v.
Kleinert's Inc., 391 F. Supp. 720, 724 (E.D. Pa. 1975); Ligget & Myers, Inc. v.
Bloomfield, 380 F. Supp. 1044, 1046 (S.D.N.Y. 1974).
107. In pro-rata contribution, total liability is determined independently and then
divided by the number of tortfeasors to determine each tortfeasor's contribution for
the injury. 10b-5 Developments, supra note 106, at 477-78.
108. See, e.g., McLean v. Alexander, 449 F. Supp. 1251, 1272 (D. Del. 1978),
rev'd on other grounds, 599 F.2d 1190 (3d Cir. 1979); Herzfeld v. Laventhol, Krek-
stein, Horwath & Horwath, 540 F.2d 27, 38-39 (2d Cir. 1976); Wassel v. Eglowsky,
399 F. Supp. 1330, 1370 (D. Md. 1975), aff'd, 542 F.2d 1235 (4th Cir. 1976).
109. E.g., Kohr v. Alleghany Airlines, Inc., 504 F.2d 400, 405 (7th Cir. 1974),
cert. denied, 421 U.S. 978 (1975); Comes v. Brodhurst, 394 F.2d 465, 468-70 (3d
Cir. 1967); Feit v. Leasco Data Processing Equip. Corp., 332 F. Supp. 544, 587
(E.D.N.Y. 1971); deHaas v. Empire Petroleum Co., 286 F. Supp. 809, 815-16 (D.
Colo. 1968), aff'd in part and vacated in part, 435 F.2d 1223 (10th Cir. 1970).
110. 449 F. Supp. 1251 (D. Del. 1978), rev'd on other grounds, 599 F.2d 1190
(3d Cir. 1979).
111. Id. at 1275.
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"vast difference between defendants in the degrees of...
wrongdoing," 112 the court believed it more equitable to apportion
liability according to the comparative fault of the defendants."' In
adopting this method of contribution, the court was influenced by the
weight of critical opinion favoring use of comparative fault as a flexi-
ble tool for the apportionment of damages '" and by the Supreme
Court's adoption of comparative fault in admiralty cases.' Ulti-
mately, the court observed that "comparative fault more directly
stimulates deterrence, is only minimally more difficult to administer
and most importantly best serves justice." 16 There is no ground to
restrict McLean's reasoning to the apportionment of damages solely
among defendants. A comparable system could be applied to appor-
tion culpability among litigants in a 10b-5 action."'
2. Due Diligence
Post-Hochfelder cases have also relied on comparative fault notions
in reformulating the due diligence requirement. The Straub court
implicitly confirmed this when it stated that, "against the background
of common law negligence, where the doctrine of comparative negli-
gence is in the ascendency, the policy of denying all recovery to a
defrauded plaintiff who was only somewhat careless or understand-
ably trusting may be questioned," 1f, and, accordingly, permitted a
recovery despite the claimant's negligence."' Similarly, in denying
the defendant's assertion of a due diligence defense, the Dupuy
112. Id. at 1272.
113. Id. at 1274-77.
114. Id. at 1274 n.77. A. Bromberg & L. Lowenfels, supra note 2. § 8.5, at
208.52; Freund and Hacker, Cutting Up the Humble Pie: A Practical Approach to
Apportioning Litigation Risks Among Underwriters, 48 St. John's L. Rev. 461, 472
(1974); Note, Contribution Under the Federal Securities Laws, 1975 Wash. U.L.Q.
1256, 1308. Contribution among violators of the securities laws based on comparative
fault has been adopted by the proposed securities code. ALl Fed. See. Code §
1724(t)(2) (1978).
115. See United States v. Reliable Transfer Co.. 421 U.S. 397, 401-11 (1975).
116. McLean v. Alexander, 449 F. Supp. 1251, 1276 (D. Del. 1978) (footnote
omitted), rev'd on other grounds, 599 F.2d 1190 (3d Cir. 1979). Two cases have
expressed approval of the reasoning in McLean, but have declined to follow it. Hei-
zer Corp. v. Ross, 601 F.2d 330, 333-34 (7th Cir. 1979); Marrero v. Abraham, 473 F.
Supp. 1271, 1277-78 (W.D. La. 1979); see 10b-5 Developments. supra note 106, at
478-79.
117. Cf. Equilease Corp. v. Smith Int'l, Inc., 588 F.2d 919, 929 & n. 12 (5th Cir.
1979) ("The notion of fault encompasses . . . both the intentional harming of another
(dolus) and the negligent harming of another (culpa)."). See also Tort Doctrine in
Louisiana: The Concept of Fault, 27 Tul. L. Rev. 1, 8-13 (1952).
118. Straub v. Vaisman & Co., 540 F.2d 591, 597 (3d Cir. 1976).
119. Id. at 598.
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court observed that "[i]t is in reality a rule of comparative fault which
is being applied . .. and the court is refusing to set up the lesser
fault [of plaintiff] against the greater [fault of defendant]." 10
As in a comparative fault analysis, the courts evaluate the relative
culpability of the parties and correctly disallow the negligence of the
claimant to preclude a recovery. 2' Unlike a comparative fault analy-
sis, however, this same rationale is then used to bestow an undimin-
ished recovery on the foolhardy claimant." The net result is a re-
covery similar to that under a "modified" comparative fault
formulation. 1" Thus, a claimant's negligence will not operate to bar a
recovery if it is slight when compared with reckless or intentionally
fraudulent conduct. 2 1 Once a claimant acts "recklessly" " or in a
manner "comparable to that of defendant," '2 however, his fault is
impliedly adjudged to be equal to or greater than that of the defend-
ant, and accordingly, he is barred. 27  Although this "modified"
methodology bears all of the vices of a contributory negligence for-
mulation, it is bereft of any of the virtues obtained under a system of
"pure" comparative fault. 12
3. Policy Considerations
As a judicially implied cause of action "z delimited by judicially im-
plied elements and defenses, rule 10b-5 represents a suitable vehicle
for the introduction of comparative fault notions into the liability pro-
visions of the securities laws. 3 ° Because the proposed liability-
120. Dupuy v. Dupuy, 551 F.2d 1005, 1018 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 911
(1977).
121. See Dupuy v. Dupuy, 551 F.2d 1005, 1020 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S.
911 (1977); Holdsworth v. Strong, 545 F.2d 687, 694 (10th Cir. 1976), cert. denied,
430 U.S. 955 (1977); Straub v. Vaisman & Co., 540 F.2d 591, 598 (3d Cir. 1976).
122. See note 121 supra.
123. See notes 90-92 supra and accompanying text.
124. Dupuy v. Dupuy, 551 F.2d 1005, 1020 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 911
(1977); Holdsworth v. Strong, 545 F.2d 687, 694 (10th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 430
U.S. 955 (1977); Straub v. Vaisman & Co., 540 F.2d 591, 596 (3d Cir. 1976); see
Bauer, The Degree of Moral Fault as Affecting Defendant's Liability, 81 U. Pa. L.
Rev. 586, 592-96 (1933) ("Courts have no compassion for defrauders.").
125. Dupuy v. Dupuy, 551 F.2d 1005, 1020 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 911
(1977).
126. Holdsworth v. Strong, 545 F.2d 687, 693 (10th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 430
U.S. 955 (1977).
127. Hirsch v. du Pont, 553 F.2d 750, 762-63 (2d Cir. 1977); Dupuy v. Dupuy,
551 F.2d 1005, 1020 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 911 (1977); Holdsworth v.
Strong, 545 F.2d 687, 693 (10th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 955 (1977).
128. See notes 94-97 supra and accompanying text.
129. See note 4 supra and accompanying text.
130. 3 A. Bromberg & L. Lowenfels, supra note 2, § 8.5, at 204.213; see Freund
& Hacker, supra note 114, at 472; Note, Contribution Under the Federal Securities
Laws, 1975 Wash. U.L.Q. 1256, 1308. Because the private lob-5 cause of action was
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reduction rule apportions losses caused by a fraudulent transaction
among all the responsible actors, it is inherently equitable.' It is
also economically efficient and consistent with the underlying pur-
poses of the private 10b-5 damage action.
The present due diligence formulation has been criticized as eco-
nomically inefficient because it promotes involuntary wealth redistribu-
tion by denying a claimant the means of recapturing wealth involun-
tarily transmitted to a defendant through an "information failure."1' 2
The crux of this argument is that resources are diverted to wrong-
doers through this redistribution.' Conversely, the receipt by a
reckless claimant of an undiminished award of damages as a result of
the abrogation of a due diligence defense is equally inefficient. By
redistributing resources to "reckless" claimants, funds that might
otherwise compensate the diligent victims whom the Securities Acts
were intended to protect are diverted.11 Alternatively, a compara-
tive fault formulation would recapture resources for defrauded
claimants in direct proportion to the assessed fault of the parties, thus
permitting a redistribution of wealth commensurate with the value
placed on the litigants' conduct by society."
The due diligence requirement also has been criticized because it
requires a claimant to expend resources to verify previously available
information prior to making an investment.' Thus, it is argued that,
"[b]ecause the cost of independent verification is greater than the
cost of disseminating existing information, the aggregate cost of inves-
tor protection rises."" Abrogation of a due diligence requirement,
however, would discount the value of a diligent claimant's informa-
tion costs by awarding a "reckless" claimant who may have incurred
insignificant or no investigation costs the same recover' received by a
diligent claimant. This promotes foolish investment behavior by dis-
couraging the assumption of investigation costs.' On the other
implied by the judiciary, comparative fault may be incorporated into it without a
legislative mandate. See notes 4-6 supra and accompanying text.
131. See notes 94-97 supra and accompanying text.
132. Abrogation of Due Care, supra note 13, at 430 & nn.158 & 159.
133. Id.
134. See Dupuy v. Dupuy, 551 F.2d 1005, 1014 (5th Cir.), cert. denied. 434 U.S.
911 (1977); Myzel v. Fields, 386 F.2d 718, 736 (8th Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 390
U.S. 951 (1968).
135. A contrary approach would recompense conduct that runs counter to one of
the aims of securities policy, the stabilization of the trading markets, by rewvarding
non-diligent investment behavior. See Dupuy v. Dupuy, 551 F.2d 1005, 1014 (5th
Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 911 (1977).
136. Abrogation of Due Care, supra note 13, at 430.
137. Id. at 430-31.
138. For example, A, a diligent plaintiff, spends $100 on verification and -alleges
$1000 in damages arising from a fraudulent transaction procured by D, the defend-
ant. B, reckless plaintiff, expends no sums on verification in a suit against D
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hand, a comparative fault formulation would consider a claimant's in-
vestigation costs as one element relating to his fault for the resulting
injury. Damages would be reduced by the difference between what
the claimant spent and what a reasonable claimant should have spent
to avoid the injury."' Diligent plaintiffs would recover larger awards
than foolish ones, thus providing an incentive to diligent behavior.
A reformulation of due diligence based on comparative fault would
be consistent with judicial attitudes to the private damage action. By
substituting a diminished recovery for the absolute bar presently in
place, the reformulated rule would provide an incentive to private
enforcement of 10b-5 violations. 4 ' Additionally, the implementation
of a comparative fault approach may promote the deterrence of
fraudulent behavior by increasing a court's willingness to impose
liability. Justice Cardozo has noted that a court would hesitate to im-
pose liability for deceitful conduct if the resulting hazards would be
"so extreme as to enkindle doubt whether a flaw may not exist in the
implication of a duty that exposes [legitimate business] to these
consequences." 141 Courts apparently are willing to reinterpret stand-
arising out of the same transaction. An abrogation of the due diligence requirement
would result in A and B each recovering $1000. In reality, however, A would recover
only $900 because of the expense incurred in verifying information. Accordingly, a
reckless plaintiff would recover more than a diligent one.
139. Absent other variables, the recovery of B in note 138 supra would be re-
duced by $100 as an index of his causative fault in the transaction. This recovery
would then equal A's. This hypothetical assumes a direct relationship between inves-
tigation costs and diligence. A larger reduction in plaintiff's recoverable damages
would follow when it was determined, for example, that plaintiff's unwillingness to
spend $100 in verification signalled a higher degree of fault.
140. The promotion of private enforcement of lob-5 violations has long been con-
sidered a desirable goal because the SEC lacks the resources to police adequately all
transactions within the ambit of rule lob-5. J.I. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426,
432 (1964). See also Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 730
(1975); Herpich v. Wallace, 430 F.2d 792, 804 (5th Cir. 1970); Wheeler, supra note
4, at 586 n.79. Moreover, the increased availability of a judgment on the merits
against defendants would allow for the offensive use of collateral estoppel by similarly
situated claimants. The doctrine of collateral estoppel provides that, when an issue
necessary to the outcome of a proceeding is litigated therein and is decided by a final
judgment on the merits, the party against whom the issue was decided is estopped
from relitigating the issue in a subsequent action. Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore,
439 U.S. 322, 324-33 (1979); 1B J. Moore, Federal Practice 0.405[4.-1], at 634-53
(2d ed. 1976); see Lawlor v. National Screen Serv. Corp., 349 U.S. 322, 326 (1955);
Commissioner v. Sunnen, 333 U.S. 591, 598-99 (1948). Conversely, the retention of
a due diligence requirement, as presently formulated, requires diligent plaintiffs in
subsequent suits to relitigate, at great expense and needless duplication, the issue of
defendant's culpability not addressed in the first suit because of the interposition of a
due diligence defense.
141. Ultramares Corp. v. Touche, 255 N.Y. 170, 179-80, 174 N.E. 441, 444
(1931); see SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833, 867 (2d Cir. 1968)
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ards of culpability to avoid awarding claimants a recovery of devas-
tating proportions to defendant.'4 2  When liability is diminished in
proportion to fault, however, a court may more willingly impose
liability for misconduct. Ultimately, the award of damages to a larger
class of plaintiffs promotes one of the central aims of the Securities
Acts, the deterrence of fraudulent behavior,' 3 by making violations
more "unprofitable" for defendants.'-"
On the other hand, the present due diligence formulation offers no
comparable advantages. Its only attractive feature, economy of admin-
istration, may be offset by the salutary effects of the reformulated
rule. 4 ' Sufficient guidelines for a jury, through the use of special
verdicts and interrogatories,' will suffice to remedy most administra-
tive difficulties.' 7
CONCLUSION
Rules, whether promulgated by legislatures or established by
courts, represent convenient mechanisms for effecting the principles
(Friendly, J. concurring), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 976 (1969).
142. See, e.g., Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 761 (1975)
("[A finding of liability] allowing this type of open-ended litigation would itself be an
invitation to fraud."); Fridrich v. Bradford, 542 F.2d 307, 321 (6th Cir. 1976) ("[A
finding of liability] would present a situation wholly lacking in the natural limitations
on damages present in cases dealing with face-to-face transactions."), cert. denied,
429 U.S. 1053 (1977); Shapiro v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 495
F.2d 228, 242 (2d Cir. 1974) ("[A]n analysis ... of the nature and character of the
Rule 10b-5 violations committed may require limiting the extent of liability
imposed .... ); Kohn v. American Metal Climax, Inc., 458 F.2d 255, 286 (3d Cir.)
("[Iln a suit on behalf of a class composed of thousands of shareholders, damages
might well extend into millions of dollars. When faced with such huge potential
payments [a lesser degree of disclosure is imposed]."), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 874
(1972). The notion is analyzed in Mullaney, Theories of Measuring Damages in Se-
curity Cases and the Effect of Damages on Liability, 46 Fordhamn L. Rev. 277, 290-
94 (1977).
143. See Dupuy v. Dupuy, 551 F.2d 1005, 1014-15 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 434
U.S. 911 (1977); Lanza v. Drexel & Co., 479 F.2d 1277, 1290 n.34 (2d Cir. 1973).
144. See Abrogation of Due Care, supra note 13, at 431-32.
145. See pt. II supra; notes 132-45 supra and accompanying text.
146. See generally H. Woods, Comparative Fault (1978). A special verdict may be
defined as "[a] special finding of facts of a case by a jury, leaving to the court the
application of the law to the facts thus found." Black's Law Dictionary 1731 (Rev. 4th
ed. 1968). Special interrogatories are asked "in addition to the instruction to return a
general verdict, and as a check on the jury's conclusions." Prosser, Comparatice
Negligence, 51 Mich. L. Rev. 465, 497 n.193 (1953).
147. The McLean court suggested several factors for consideration when admin-
istering the apportionment of damages among defendants. They include "the
defendant's extent of involvement, duration of involvement, knowledge of entire
scheme to defraud, intent, extent of his contribution toward causation of the losses
and benefit received." McLean v. Alexander, 449 F. Supp. 1251, 1276 n.84 (D. Del.
1978), rev'd on other grounds, 599 F.2d 1190 (3d Cir. 1979) (citation omitted). Simi-
lar factors could be used to apportion damages among plaintiffs and defendants.
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that underlie them. When a rule may be reformulated to reflect more
accurately its underlying principles, the reformulation should not be
summarily dismissed merely because it departs radically from existing
precedent. A reformulation of the due diligence requirement in pri-
vately prosecuted actions under rule 10b-5 based on comparative fault
equitably apportions liability among litigants in an economically effi-
cient manner and is consistent with the purposes of the Securities
Acts. Moreover, the rationales for incorporating comparative fault
into the due diligence requirement need not be restricted to this area
alone. Other defenses to violations of the Securities Acts may benefit
from a similar reformulation. When fault is the basis of liability, a
modern approach to securities regulation commends the consideration
of comparative fault.
Mario J. Suarez
